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Abstract: 
At the stage of international post-Kyoto negotiations, the adoption of ambitious public 
policies raises an increasing interest, as society has a whole is more concerned by the scale of 
damages and the potential irreversibilities linked to climate change. The introduction of a 
tradable permits market in Europe on January 1, 2005, in order to provide incentives to 
Member-States to take early abatement measures, may be seen as a decisive first step towards 
that direction. The creation of the EU ETS has indeed revealed the key role played by the 
European Union in the preservation of the global public good that constitutes the climate. 
Following a review of current climate policies, and of the negotiations under way at the 
international level, this article critically discusses the main advantages of introducing 
environmental regulation tools such as tradable permits markets. 
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Review of current climate policies 
The European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) has been created on 
January 1, 2005 to reduce by 8% CO2 emissions in the European Union by 2012, relative to 
1990 emissions levels. This aggregated emissions reduction target in the EU has been 
achieved following differentiated agreements, sharing efforts between Member States based 
on their potential of CO2 emissions reduction. The introduction of a tradable permits market 
has been decided to help Member States in achieving their targets in the Kyoto Protocol. This 
international agreement entered into force on February 2005 following the ratification of 
Iceland, and which aims at reducing the emissions of six greenhouse gases (GHG), namely 
carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, ozone, water vapour and halocarbons, considered as 
the main cause of climate change.  
Among the Members of Annex B, these agreements include CO2 emissions reductions 
for 38 industrialized countries, with a global reduction of CO2 emissions by 5,2%. These 
agreements have been fostered by the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC) which recognizes three principles: the precautionary principle2, the 
principle of common but differentiated responsibilities3, and the principle of the right to 
development4. 174 countries have ratified the Protocol, with the notorious exception of the 
United States. The first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol goes from January 1, 2008 
to December 31, 2012. 
 This political will has been reaffirmed at the international level during the UN 
Conference that took place in Bali on December 2007, where a roadmap of negotiations that 
should lead to a post-Kyoto agreement has been adopted. The United States are expected to 
cooperate, given the initiatives of emissions reduction introduced at the regional level5. The 
next round of negotiations will take place in Copenhagen on December 2009. As the Clean 
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Development Mechanism (CDM)6 has revealed the strong potential of CO2 emissions 
abatement in countries such as Brazil, China or India, the main issue of these negotiations is 
linked to achieving the largest possible level of cooperation, in order to avoid the well-known 
free riders behaviours, and to preserve the global public good that constitutes the climate. On 
this matter, the European Union has clearly adopted a leadership position, which contrasts 
with its early reluctance during the first steps of the negotiation of the Kyoto Protocol. 
 On January 2008, the European Commission has extended the scope of its action 
against global warming by 2020 with the “energy and climate change” package. This package 
aims at reducing GHG emissions by 20%, at increasing the use of renewable energy in energy 
consumption to 20%, and at saving 20% of energy by increasing energy efficiency. The 
European carbon market, which has currently entered its Phase II (2008-2012), has been 
confirmed until 2020 also. Its scope has been extended to major sectors in terms of CO2 
emissions growth, such as aviation and petro-chemical industries during 2013-2020. These 
repeated public policies in favour of climate protection aim at correcting the negative 
externality attached to the release of uncontrolled GHG emissions in the atmosphere and thus, 
according to the well-known principle in economics, at internalizing the social cost of carbon. 
At the same time, these initiatives reveal the difficulty to create a scarcity condition regarding 
CO2 emissions. These emissions indeed were not limited in the pre-existing institutional 
environment, and thus could not be considered as a scarce resource. 
Below, a discussion on how a tradable permit differs from other environmental 
regulation tools is presented, and key design issues that make emissions trading work are 
highlighted. 
 
 
How is a tradable permit different? 
To answer this question, it appears useful to debate first about the notions of “right to 
pollute” and of “marketability of the environment”. One may recall for instance the 
controversy initiated by the introduction of tradable permits markets in the United States, and 
summarized by Sandel (1997). 
Since the aim of the Kyoto Protocol is to limit the global level of GHG, one might ask, 
what difference does it make which places on the planet send less GHGs to the sky? It may 
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make no difference from the standpoint of the heavens, but it does make a political difference. 
Turning pollution into a commodity to be bought and sold removes the moral stigma that is 
properly associated with it, if a company or a country is fined for spewing excessive 
pollutants into the air, the community conveys its judgment that the polluter has done 
something wrong. A fee, on the other hand, makes pollution just another cost of doing 
business, like wages, benefits and rents. 
One may object to these remarks that it is not immoral to reduce acid rain by half 
through tradable permit system among electrical utilities in the United States, reducing 
sulphur dioxide faster than anyone had predicted, and saving up to U.S.$ 1 billion a year for 
electricity consumers (see Ellerman et al. (2000)). Besides, virtually any manufacturing 
activity entails the creation of some pollution. So the question is not will we pollute, but 
rather how much. Further, if there is to be pollution, the regulator shall try to provide 
economic incentives in order to fight against negative consequences on the environment. Such 
a trade-off is facilitated by tradable rights. 
Thus, maintaining a moral stigma on pollution makes sense for hazardous substances 
where polluters have choices, for reducing the pollution. But global warming is not such a 
situation. Indeed, do we need to feel ashamed when we cook dinner, switch on a light, or turn 
on a computer to write an article? These daily habits may not be associated with immoral 
behaviours. However, the current level of consumption per capita, on several locations on the 
planet, does not seem compatible with the observed global warming. Thus, the debate on the 
introduction of tradable permits markets avoids discussing the fact that the state of the planet 
can no longer afford consumption lifestyles with cheap energy prices. 
Let us now discuss about the increasing influence of the market as a regulation tool of 
environmental externalities. With the extension of the scope of human activity, one can notice 
a trend of increasing demand for environmental goods. High-income societies tend to value 
environmental goods more, according to the environmental Kuznets curve7. Therefore, how 
do we manage the scarcity of environmental goods? Simultaneously, a trend of increased 
reliance on markets may be underlined, as in Europe many fields have been deregulated 
(telecoms, electricity, etc.). Let us further distinguish between organized markets, where the 
government mainly enforces regulation8, and constructed markets that appear in the 
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environmental field where there is a need to set up an institution9. The latter case involves a 
redefinition of the government role which consists in creating the market for individual needs, 
and then not coming back to regulate. 
The circumstances that are favourable to the adoption of tradable permits include a 
large number of agents to regulate, an asymmetrical and strategic access to information, a 
high level of heterogeneity of costs and opportunities across decentralised agents, and 
uncertainty about the shape of cost and damage curves10. In a cap and trade system, agents are 
allowed to exchange permits with a quantity limit, without regulatory approval, where the 
regulator compliance requirement is to monitor emissions and surrender permits. The “rights 
to emit” are created as permits endow the installation. Firms need to meet the terms of that 
implicit contract: permits become an input to production, and are traded as such. The 
abatement decision is shifted to firms, since they have more information of what can be done 
than the regulator. Thus, the regulator only needs to enforce the emissions cap. 
Does emissions trading have effects that would tamper enthusiasm for this instrument? 
The U.S. Acid Rain Program provided empirical support to the view that market-based 
instruments may be more environmentally efficient than command and control regulation. 
SO2 emissions fell, and the program was characterized by a quick implementation, a positive 
role of banking (twice as much as required), a good compliance and no hot spots. These 
optimistic results may be limited to flow pollutants, since for stock pollutants like CO2 the 
incentive to abate is less temporally and spatially constraining. Finally, Babiker et al. (2004) 
underline that all countries do not benefit equally from the introduction of an international 
system of exchangeable quotas, given the pre-existing institutional environment and the 
terms-of-trade effects. 
Following the discussion of the main differences of tradable permits markets with 
regard to other environmental regulation tools, we detail next the choices that need to be made 
by the regulator during the creation of the tradable permits market to ensure its cost-efficiency 
and environmental integrity, especially concerning the spatial and temporal limits, the initial 
allocation, as well as the introduction of a safety valve. 
 
 
Market design issues 
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Spatial and temporal limits 
Concerning spatial limits, it is worth emphasizing scaling issues. Increasing the scale 
of the cap and trade system increases economic efficiency, but also decreases trade security. 
The regulator also needs to take into account deposition constraints, by avoiding excedance of 
critical loads in specific geographical zones11. Another concern lies in the proper design of 
national emission ceilings. 
Concerning temporal limits, banking and borrowing may be used to equalize marginal 
costs in present value. It forms another dimension of efficiency by adding the time dimension 
to cost savings. The authorization of these provisions appears desirable on a tradable permit 
market, since they allow firms to achieve their depolluting objective at least cost by 
smoothing their emissions overtime. However, they may also change the temporal profile as 
well as the magnitude of environmental damages. From the regulator’s viewpoint, the best 
configuration of the intertemporal flexibility mechanism therefore consists in authorizing 
banking without restrictions, and in penalizing borrowing by using a non-unitary 
intertemporal exchange ratio (Rubin (1996), Kling & Rubin (1997)). 
 
Initial allocation 
According to Raymond (1996), initial allocation reveals social norms, and what 
society considers as acceptable on how to distribute the newly created permits. 
Different allocation methodologies may be chosen, such as methodologies based on 
grandfathering (free distribution in proportion of recent emissions or a benchmark), 
auctioning, baseline emissions, or per capita allocation. It is not obvious to tell how tradable 
permits should be allocated. Even if theory suggests that auctioning is the best methodology 
(Ekins & Barker (2001), Jouvet et al. (2005)), it rises equity-based objections. The definition 
of what is "fair" is problematic, and a “compromise”12 must be found between local and 
global interests, which in return bring us to what appears “acceptable”, for instance 
concerning climate policies at the international level. 
Newell et al. (2005) emphasize that tradable permits create rents, and grandfathering 
distributes those rents to existing firms while also erecting barriers to entry. To counter-
balance these negative effects, let us note that the direct allocation of grandfathered permits 
offers a degree of political control over the distributional effects of regulation, enabling the 
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formation of majority coalitions. Once the permits market has been introduced, then the 
regulator may strengthen the environmental constraint. 
Finally, the regulator may choose emission targets in absolute value (a fixed amount of 
permits known in advance), or in relative value (with respect to production or to a 
technological standard for instance) (Ellerman & Wing (2003)). 
It appears useful to distinguish between the effectiveness of a tradable permit market, 
i.e. how much emission reduction it will achieve, from its economic performance, i.e. what 
allocation effects are to be expected. 
The main interest of auctioning permits consists in the income transfer, which may 
take the form of a lump-sum or a tax rebate, and reduces pre-existing distortions. This 
recycling revenue effect, also called double dividend, takes place when auctioning permits 
allows decreasing taxes and reducing distortions. This should have a positive effect on supply 
of capital and labour, but the net effect on high- or low-income quintiles depends on the tax 
structure. If the tax cut benefits more to richer people, then there is a clear trade-off between 
efficiency and equity (Dinan & Rogers (2002)). 
 
Safety valve 
A safety valve is a hybrid instrument to limit the cost of capping emissions at some 
target level, whereby the regulator offers to sell permits in whatever quantity at a pre-
determined price. If prices are greater than expected, the marginal cost of abatement would be 
limited to the safety valve price. The regulator tries to set the emissions cap at a level where 
the expected marginal cost of meeting the constraint will match the beliefs about marginal 
benefits. Another advantage consists in keeping the attractiveness of a quantity target, and the 
use of a price mechanism in order to regulate the emissions of pollutants. The main criticism 
of a safety valve consists in the determination of a “fair” price by the regulator: if the safety 
valve price is too high, it will have no effect. Conversely, if the safety valve is too low, the 
quantity constraint is not binding anymore, and may be associated with a permanent tax. 
Moreover, there is a potential loss of “environmental integrity”, i.e. a fear of relaxing towards 
target reduction instead of supporting economically efficient implementation. The regulator 
shall thus attempt to avoid excessive violations of the original target. Finally, it is worth 
asking whether it appears useful to dilute the quantity constraint. 
The RECLAIM program in California regulating SO2 and NOX emissions constitutes 
a good example of a system that would have required a safety valve. According to Harrison 
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(2003), this multi-source program had overlapping control cycles and trading between control 
groups, so de facto six-month banking and borrowing. But the temporal flexibility was not 
enough for such a limited geographic scope and, as unusual weather conditions and lack of 
new capacities placed high demand on existing units, the permit price rose from $5,000 to 
$90,000 per ton, i.e. multiplied by 18. The disconnection of electricity and environmental 
markets, associated with other program design failures13, led the State to eventually took over 
and provide adequate electricity supply. At the same time, prices of future vintages 
(borrowing) revealed the short-term nature of the crisis and recognized that it was an unusual 
case. 
Jacoby & Ellerman (2004) recall that the discussions on the adoption of a safety valve 
emerged in the United States concerning the costs involved by the Kyoto Protocol. It was 
discussed as a way of raising the likelihood of the ratification of the Protocol, by blunting the 
criticism that the cost of meeting the Kyoto targets would be too high. 
However, it does not always appear profitable to limit price variations on tradable 
permit markets. Allowances are indeed distributed freely, and form another asset 
compensating the cost of the constraint on CO2 emissions, which tend to stabilize the net 
financial position of firms. Moreover, financial instruments are being developed in order to 
hedge against the risk of temporary price variations, for instance on the EU ETS. Thus, in 
order to obtain stable and predictable prices, Member States shall simply levy a tax, which 
does not appear politically feasible at the international level. 
 
 
Concluding Remarks 
This article reviewed the wide array of choices that must be made by the regulator 
during the creation of tradable permit markets, such as the EU ETS and the Kyoto Protocol. 
We highlighted numerous debates at stake concerning the spatial and temporal limits, the 
allocation methodology, and the introduction of a safety valve. As a final comment, it should 
be emphasized that emissions trading involves a steep learning curve for regulatory bodies 
and market participants alike, which brings institutional learning effects and further 
amendments to the development of the trading systems currently operating. 
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